HCLASSIFIED

Tan Discrete of Land and Tableron

11/14/62

-) : The Secretary

PHROUGH:

Ta - Thomas L. Hughes 🖟

LILLA I NOTE: IT TO CART IN A IN CUBA

Mark a substitute to a line of the Kramlin recognition to supest the he foresees a paragraph period of pulling an incling be. g set of the Cuban erabic. His remarks have remore lov. ... in may, as on oct of the post, be fine and only sig. Lion. Co in Non-Invasion on . Kirk we starte whose while Cuben linders did not believe to incommunities and to in the Cube, he lid, and further that he had . ur a the Cheans that if the President did not keep his word it would mead wer. Thus, Wirm, I we gives the a pression of believing that it a now also for him to offer the Cube . a limit int which Moscow has - I hast in public -- evolded fiving Men ... a Reduced. While putting of a show of buoyant . : . - Infide I take benefit of the foreign [1 5, 1., thatev said that has "forty uile thre "publishly" -- he up. the , is word in this connection on rouse home. He said the world is not generate the fall, of the precipice of nuclear war" -- an unusually bullsmian formulation for the met I thier though the gener. Thems of how the se to war all world



recent boydet printumeements.

rould have been in not for Soviet corollagance has been a far are of

A 30

Limited Not London Need. 2. Evidently wars that the Libert Wood be likely to these to a summit meeting as long as the Cuban electron. An remains unresolved, Khrushelov Low profess, to see an argent not to one. For the present, he that the colored himself from even the tentent commitment to a mooting ingles in his Cotabar 24 leater to Exercise Russall. Heverthanks, Khrushe as instances to hold on a the project of an agreement on a nuclear law can be a result of "oute-retain below with the US.

But, as was true of earlier indications of optimism that a test bon, he gives no indication that the S inc. Union may be prepared to accept an obligation to permit whether image vision.

Soviet Court. While amounting that the prosent wifet certiss will end of November 20 (the previously impounded to a first and of management, i.e. testing, at November 26ripu), he stated that the USSR will contain a preparing further tests, and would carry them c.t in the absonce of agreement. He can be successful a unilateral solution approach.

By the in Abstrace. Mushohev refraint from saying anything of substance about Berlin. He does state that the problem "is assuring greater acuteness," -- the first time such a note of urgency has been in waited since the Chan uricle -- have gives no indication of that which he right take and pointsofly avoids setting any deadline for each or fibial of negotionisms on the "abject.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE THE DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

To : The Secretary

THROUGH : S/S

FROM : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

INTELLIGENCE NOTE: KHRUSHCHEV PREPARES FOR LONG END GAME IN CUBAN CRISIS

Khrushchev remarks to Western newsmen at a Kremlin reception today suggest that he foresees a protracted period of pulling and hauling before any settlement of the Cuban crisis. His remarks have not been reported by Soviet media and may, as on occasion in the past, be intended only for foreign consumption.

Confidence in Non-Invasion Guarantee. Khrushchev stated that while Cuban leaders did not believe the President's promise not to invade Cuba, he did, and further that he had assured the Cubans that if the President did not keep his word it would mean war. Thus, Khrushchev gives the impression of believing that it is now safe for him to offer the Cubans a commitment which Moscow has -- at least in public -- avoided giving.

Tension Reduced. While putting on a show of buoyant self-confidence for the benefic of the foreign press, Khrushchev said that his "forty" missiles are "probably" -- he uses the vague word in this connection -- en route home. He said the world is no longer at the "edge of the precipice of nuclear war" -- an unusually Dullesian formulation for the Soviet Fremier, though the general theme of how close to war the world would have been if not for Soviet follower, noe has been a feature of recent Soviet prenouncements.

CONFIDENTIAL

Summit No Longer Needed. Evidently aware that the US would not be likely to agree to a summit meeting as long as the Cuban situation remains unresolved. Khrushchev now professes to see no urgent need for one. For the present, he thus absolves himself from even the tentative commitment to a meeting implied in his October 24 letter to Bertrand Russell. Nevertheless, Khrushchev continues to hold open the prospect of an agreement on a nuclear test ban as a result of "tete-a-tete" talks with the US.

But, as was true of earlier indications of optimism about a test ban, he gives no indication that the Soviet Union may be prepared to accept an obligation to permit on-site inspection.

Soviet Tests. While announcing that the present Soviet series will end on November 20 (the previously announced date for the end of maneuvers, i.e. testing, at Novaya Zemlya), he states that the USSR will continue preparing furths: tests, and would carry them out in the absence of agreement. He thus seems to rule our a unilateral Soviet moratorium gambit.

<u>Berlin in Abevance</u>. Khrushchev refrains from saying anything of substance about Berlin. He does state that the problem "is assuming greater acuteress," - the first time such a note of urgency has been introduced since the Cuban crisis -- but gives of indication of what action he might take and pointedly avoids setting any deadline for citner the start or finish of negotiations on the subject.